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ORIGINAL PAPER
What was the law of Leptines’ really about? 
Reflections on Athenian public economy and legislation 
in the fourth century BCE
Mirko Canevaro1 
 
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract The article investigates a case study of fiscal policy formation in fourth 
century BCE Athens: that of the law of Leptines. The law was enacted but later 
challenged through a procedure of constitutional judicial review (graphe nomon me 
epitedeion theinai). Through a detailed analysis of the arguments at the trial, the 
article reconstructs the financial issues that the law was meant to solve, regarding 
the liturgical system and its wider implications. Recent scholarship has highlighted 
the complexity and sophistication of Athenian public finances and economic pol-
icy. The article finds a window into the debates from which the relevant institutions 
originated.
Keywords Public finances · Athens · Trade · Taxation · Ancient economy
JEL Classification F13 · H2 · H3 · K4 · N43
1  Introduction: war, financial problems and trade 
in mid‑fourth‑century Athens
Scholarship on the ancient Greek city-states has abandoned in recent years primi-
tivist assumptions to acknowledge the extraordinary level of economic and fiscal 
All references to ancient sources are according to the abbreviations of the Oxford Classical 
Dictionary: http://class ics.oxfor dre.com/stati cfile s/image s/ORECL A/OCD.ABBRE VIATI ONS.pdf. 
All references to Classical journals follow the abbreviations of L’Année philologique: http://www.
annee -philo logiq ue.com/files /sigle s_fr.pdf.
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sophistication achieved by states such as Athens. Just a few years ago, the consensus 
was that the Greek city-states were characterised by primitive economies managed 
by a political class of dilettantes. Our picture is now radically changed, with histori-
ans such as Bresson (2000, 2015), Harris, Lewis (e.g. Harris–Lewis–Woolmer 2015, 
particularly the introduction by Harris and Lewis) and Ober (2015b) showing the 
high level of sophistication of economic activity and of the institutional framework 
that underpinned it. Equally significantly, Migeotte, in the monumental Les finances 
des cités grecques: aux périodes classique et hellénistique of 2014, has provided a 
comprehensive synthesis of the organisation of the public finances of the Greek city-
states.1 To quote one reviewer, ‘[t]he main conclusion [of Migeotte’s work] is that 
their public finances were well-resourced in a diversity of finely tuned, complemen-
tary ways, competently run in terms of budget planning and book-keeping, with a 
savvy eye to the possibilities of public ownership of resources (hence taxes but also 
rents and fees), and simply of the fungibility of cash. The latter is a field in which 
Athens, both at the level of the central state and of the demes (with limited scope 
for taxation, multiple items expenditure, and a combination of landed resources and 
cash), played a pioneering role’.2 These results can be vividly illustrated by one fact 
observed by van Wees (2013: 1): Athens in the fourth century BCE spent more sil-
ver than France did during the Napoleonic Wars.
This new picture creates however new questions. Many of the studies above focus 
on institutions—on particular or widespread legal, political and fiscal arrangements 
that fostered growth. But once we recognise the sophistication of the public finances 
of the Greek city states, we are bound to wonder how wide-spread (and concen-
trated) economic and financial expertise was formed and performed in democratic 
political contexts where delegation was rare and imperfect, and major economic pol-
icy was decided by huge numbers of citizens attending the Assembly and the Coun-
cil.3 One way to make inroads into this problem is to investigate, at the macro-level, 
the epistemic quality of Athenian (and Greek) democracy: how well did Athenian 
democracy succeed in aggregating scattered knowledge into sound policy decisions? 
This is the route taken in some very influential work by Ober (2008, 2013, 2015b).
My approach here focuses on the micro-level: on the formation of particular fis-
cal policy decisions, on the problems that these decisions tackled, on the nature—
the effectiveness and the pitfalls—of the proposals made and on the debates that 
developed around them. The evidence is rarely fine-grained enough to allow us to 
follow these debates as they unfolded. But a prime case study is without a doubt 
mid-fourth century Athens. The inscriptional evidence, combined with plentiful lit-
erary evidence and with many speeches written by the Attic orators (and Demos-
thenes in particular) in the Assembly and in the lawcourts, allow us to reconstruct 
these debates, to dissect the proposals voiced and to follow the arguments in favour 
1 See also Pritchard (2015) and Ober (2015a).
2 J. Ma, Review of Migeotte (2014), BMCR 2015.08.27: http://bmcr.brynm awr.edu/2015/2015-08-27.
html.
3 Studies on the formation of financial expertise in ancient Greece are still rare, see e.g. Kallet-Marx 
(1994) and Davies (2004).
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and against some of these proposals. In this article, I shall focus on particular fis-
cal and economic policy proposals advanced in those central years and discussed in 
the Assembly and, more extensively, in the lawcourts, where they were examined in 
cases of constitutional judicial review.
To set the scene, I want to focus briefly on a key text about the Athenian pub-
lic economy and its reliance on revenues from trade: Xenophon’s Poroi. This text, 
whose title is usually translated as Ways and Means, has a subtitle in our manu-
scripts: peri prosodon, ‘on state revenues’. The historical context in which Xeno-
phon’s treatise was written is that of 355/4, in the aftermath of the Social War.4 
This war, started in 357/6 by powerful allies (or better, subjects) of Athens—Byz-
antium, Chios and Rhodes—ended with Athens’ defeat and the disintegration of its 
imperial ambitions. Athens was left for the second time in fifty-years without a real 
empire  (apart from minor allies) and prostrated by war.5 In a speech written after 
the defeat, Isocrates (8.61–81) argued that Athens should finally abandon imperial 
ambitions. The city was economically exhausted: its revenues were down to 130 tal-
ents a year (Dem. 10.37). To get a sense of the gravity of the situation, it suffices to 
recall that a partially recovered Athens would manage in 346 to return to 400 talents 
a year in revenues (Dem. 10.37–8), and a few years after the defeat at Chaeronea 
against Philip II of Macedon (338 BCE), thanks to the wise administration of the 
politician Lycurgus, these would more than double again, going up to 1200 ([Plut.] 
Vit. X Or. 842f).6 That Athens could recover from defeat and  the loss of its most 
important allies and reach once again such heights of economic bonanza is a testa-
ment to the abilities of the administrators that controlled its public finances in those 
years, to the wisdom of the demos, and to the effectiveness of the democratic institu-
tions. Xenophon’s Poroi is one of a number of texts from the second half of the 350s 
that allow us to follow closely the debate on public finances that led to such a recov-
ery. Many of Xenophon’s proposals are found in the programmes of politicians such 
as Eubulus and Lycurgus. This is not to say that Xenophon was behind their political 
action. But he was certainly attuned to the solutions that were aired and discussed.7
Xenophon explains how Athens could increase the number of merchants and visi-
tors, which would in turn increase exports and imports, and therefore sales, rents 
and customs, making up for the revenues lost with the empire (3.6–7). This could 
4 On Xenophon’s Poroi see in particular Gauthier (1976, 1984), as well as, e.g. Dillery (1993), Bloch 
(2004) and Lewis (2010). Many of these studies are marred by various shades of a primitivist under-
standing of Greek economy, which has now grown progressively (and rightly) unpopular. Exceptions are 
Cawkwell (1963: 63–65), Giglioni (1970: xi–xv, xxxiii, lxii, lxx, lxxxviii, cvii, cxxx–cxxxii), Whitehead 
(1977: 125, 128), Lowry (1987: 49), Burke (1992: 208) and Sealey (1993: 113).
5 For a short summary of the war see Rhodes (2010: 75–76). For more detail and extensive bibliography 
see Sealey (1993: 102–136); Canevaro (2016a, b: 3–7, 323–325). The Second Athenian League was not 
dissolved, but Athens lost all the most important allies (see Paus. 1.25.3)
6 Cfr. Theop. FGrH 115, F 166; Dem. 19.89; 8.45; 9.40; 10.38
7 On the development of fiscal expertise and institutions in Athens see in particular Davies (2004); cf. 
Pritchard (2015: 1–27) on Athenian debates on public finances, and passim on Athens’ budget, and Ober 
(2015b) on Athenian finances. Cawkwell (1963) argues for a direct link between Eubulus’ policies and 
Xenophon’s proposals, noting that, according to Diog. Laert. 2.59, Eubulus sponsored Xenophon’s recall 
from exile.
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be achieved with no need for direct investment, but rather through good legislation. 
Xenophon (3.1–5) stresses particularly the availability of silver coinage, thanks to 
the Laurion mines—he proposes to intensify their exploitation. The complex Athe-
nian legislation on the mines, and the extant speeches in the orators concerned with 
disputes over mine concessions, show that during these years the Athenians did 
indeed implement measures to maximize their exploitation.8 He also proposes that 
the Athenians should implement measures to ensure the expedite resolution of dis-
putes arising from trade, so to make Athens the favourite trading partner, and these 
were actually introduced.9
Xenophon’s final proposal is that front seats in the theatre should be offered to 
particularly meritorious traders, and that occasionally they may be entertained and 
dined at the Prytaneion.10 This way, traders would choose to come to Athens not 
only for profit, but also in the hope of receiving such honours. What Xenophon 
is talking about is public honours for benefactors of the city: these were reserved 
for euergetai (benefactors), victorious generals, magistrates that had distinguished 
themselves for their performance in office, and indeed for traders whose commer-
cial activities were particularly vital for Athens.11 Such honours are attested earlier 
on, but they became in fact particularly prominent in the epigraphical record from 
the 350s.12 Granting such honours was one of the instruments used by the city to 
attract traders as well as foreign rulers that controlled essential goods for the city 
(e.g. grain) to give Athens preferential treatment.13
Xenophon’s proposal was not as innovative as he seems to imply: these grants 
were already common. But their mention was probably connected to controversies at 
the end of the Social War. Issues of long term economic and trade policy were at the 
time at odds with the short-term needs for revenues to keep the machine of the state 
going. We find traces of such controversies in several speeches of Demosthenes, and 
in measures discussed and enacted in these years.14 Eubulus was probably the most 
incisive in tackling these problems, succeeding in increasing Athenian revenues to 
400 talents per year. His success (Plut. Mor. 812ff.) was due to long-term policies, 
13 See Canevaro (2016a, b: 83–85) for honours available for foreign traders.
14 Schaefer (1885–1887: I, pp. 179–180, 361–363, 415–416) was the first to identify this economic pol-
icy. See Canevaro (2016a, b: 6–7) for examples.
8 For an accessible discussion of these trials, and of the relevant legislation, see MacDowell (2006, 
2009: 266–269). For mining operations in Athens, and their effectiveness, see now van Liefferinge 
(2018). For the leasing of mines see Hopper (1953, 1968), Aperghis (1997), Shipton (2000), and Rhodes 
and Osborne (2003).
9 The main book-length studies of these procedures are Cohen (1973) and Vélissaropoulos (1980). See 
now Harris (2015).
10 See Canevaro (2016a, b: 220–221, 330–331).
11 On honours in Athens see Canevaro (2016a, b: 77–97).
12 Engen (2010: 276–325) identifies nine honorary decrees awarded for trade reasons before the 350s 
BCE, and 24 between 350 and 320 (see also Mitchell 1997: 142; Hagamajer Allen 2003: 237–238; 
Moreno 2007: 189; Lambert 2011: 178–179; 2012: 377–386; Liddel 2016: 311; Bissa 2009: 190–191; 
Canevaro 2016a, b: 77–98).
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often in line with Xenophon’s suggestions15: efforts to re-establish the Piraeus’ pri-
macy with new legal procedures to resolve commercial disputes (dikai emporikai) 
quickly,16 investments in infrastructure for traders (Din. 1.96), investments in the 
Laurion mines (Dem. 19.293).17 Eubulus is also credited with restructuring Athe-
nian finances by making the theorikon fund, which incentivised the citizens’ par-
ticipation to festivals by providing payments to those who attended, more central.18 
He also sponsored investment in the water and road infrastructure (Dem. 3.29), and 
started a policy to strengthen the fleet, building new dockyards, wharves, and piers 
(IG  II2 1613 l. 302; 505 ll. 12–13; Din. 1.96; Aeschin. 3.25). He also participated in 
legal actions to acquire liquidity to tackle short-term financial problems, particularly 
against public debtors (Dem. 19.293; 21.218). Demosthenes was also part of these 
debates: he proposed in 354/3 BCE (Dion. Ad Ammaeum I, 1.4) to raise the number 
of citizens included in the trierarchic symmories (see Sect. 3), and in 349/8 BCE 
argued against the use of the military fund to pay for festival costs (Dem. 1.19–20, 
3.10–13).
In this article, I focus on one legal case, that of Demosthenes’ speech Against 
Leptines (20). This case had to do specifically with the balancing out of short-term 
issues of financial sustainability and longer-term targets of fostering foreign trade. 
The speech was written and pronounced by Demosthenes in 355/4 BCE for a graphe 
nomon me epitedeion theinai (public charge for enacting an inappropriate law), a 
procedure of constitutional judicial review to which all laws could be subjected for 
‘unconstitutionality’. Its aim was to repeal a law enacted by a famous politician, 
Leptines of Coile.19 It is particularly representative because it illuminates the politi-
cal and legal constraints that Athenian institutions placed on reform of any kind, and 
particularly on financial reform. Many reform bills, apart from being discussed in 
the Council, the Assembly and often among the nomothetai, had to undergo consti-
tutional judicial review, and were assessed for their coherence with the existing laws 
and the overall ‘constitutional’ spirit of the laws of the city (see Section 2).
It is clear that the law abolished previous grants of ateleia (tax exemption) and 
forbade such grants for the future. It went against Xenophon’s advice: it took away 
from civic benefactors honours that had already been given, and prevented the Athe-
nian state from using this instrument to foster trade. This is Demosthenes’ main 
objection: it is wrong to take away honours already given to benefactors, and pre-
venting the Athenians from honouring benefactors in the future will have disastrous 
effects on Athenian trade. What were Leptines’ reasons for proposing such a law? 
And what was exactly the scope of the law? Did it apply to all forms of tax exemp-
tion? Regretfully we can only read Demosthenes’ speech, one of the three accusation 
15 Cawkwell (1963: 56), Oliver (2011: 122) and passim. Diog. Laert. 2.59 states that Eubulus sponsored 
Xenophon’s return from exile.
16 Cawkwell (1963: 63–64), Sealey (1993: 116); cf. Engels (1988).
17 Cawkwell (1963: 64–65).
18 Cawkwell (1963: 55–61) and passim; against the existence of a law by Eubulus forbidding using the 
theorikon for military purposes, see Harris (1996: 57–76); cf. Oliver (2011: 122–123); for this fund see 
Faraguna (1992: 189–193). Roselli (2009) argues that this fund was created in this very period (cf. Rho-
des 1981: 514).
19 For question about the trial that is not answered in this article see Canevaro (2016a, b), an extensive 
commentary of this speech. See also Kremmydas (2012).
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speeches. We do not have Leptines’ defence speech, nor can we read those of Dem-
osthenes’ supporters. Even worse, we do not have the full text of Leptines’ law, and, 
as it will become clear, Demosthenes is unreliable when representing its range of 
application and its consequences.
My aim is to reconstruct the actual provisions of Leptines’ law, its range of appli-
cation, and the problems it was meant to tackle. In the aftermath of the Social War, 
the Athenians enacted extensive legislation that tried to reinforce trade as a source 
of wealth for the city. At the same time, they dealt with an acute shortage of funds 
and contributors that endangered the most basic public services, particularly those 
funded through the liturgies—semi-voluntary financial performances in which an 
individual took charge of a particular public service (see Sect. 3). Xenophon (like 
Demosthenes) sheds light on one side of the debate: the importance of trade to 
increase revenues, and of honours to increase trade. Reconstructing the background 
of Leptines’ law sheds light on the other side: the need for a steady flow of money 
(and liturgists) to secure in the short-term the orderly running of the state machine.
Sections 2 and 3 provide accounts of Athenian procedures for enacting new laws 
(and of constitutional judicial review), and of the Athenian liturgical system, as 
background for the discussion of Leptines’ law. Section 4 discusses Leptines’ law, 
the reasons for its enactment, the debates about Athenian finances from which it 
originated, and what this case study tells us about Athenian priorities in the mid-
fourth century BCE.
2  Lawmaking and constitutional judicial review
The case against the law of Leptines was part of a wider, multi-stage procedure of 
lawmaking: nomothesia. This procedure had been created at the end of the fifth 
century BCE, after the restoration of democracy. It underpinned the newly insti-
tuted distinction between nomoi (laws) and psephismata (decrees), by providing a 
more complex route for enacting nomoi, different from the regular one for enacting 
psephismata.20
The distinction was between nomoi as general permanent rules and psephis-
mata—‘situational’ enactments, ad hoc decrees valid in a specific context, at a 
specific time, and for a limited time, or meant for one person only.21 All general 
permanent rules—nomoi—were conceptualized as higher-level rules and accord-
ingly enacted through a different procedure (nomothesia). And all were binding on 
lower-level enactments (psephismata; see Andoc. 1.87; Dem. 23.218; 24.30; Hyp. 
Ath. 5.22). Thus, the sovereign power of the demos in the Assembly was limited—
bound by a set of higher-order rules—and the demos could not freely enact any-
thing it wished. The Athenians had in fact a public charge that could be brought 
against decrees—lower-level enactments—that contradicted existing laws: graphe 
20 I have discussed the development of the distinction between nomoi and psephismata, and the origins 
of nomothesia, in Canevaro (2015), with full bibliographical information.
21 Hansen (1978, 1979).
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paranomon. The case would be heard by a lawcourt, and whoever brought the charge 
had to state in the graphe—the written indictment—what nomoi exactly the pse-
phisma contradicted. Thus, any decree of the Council or of the Assembly was meant 
to be consistent with every single piece of existing and valid legislation (nomoi).
Nomoi were not enacted through simple Assembly procedure,22 but through a 
more complex procedure of nomothesia. I summarise here the procedure according 
to my own reconstruction, which I have argued at length elsewhere.23 In fourth-cen-
tury Athens, to pass a law, the demos first acted in the form of the Council of Five 
Hundred, selected by lot. The Council set the agenda for the Assembly, and could be 
persuaded to put nomothesia in the agenda of the next Assembly. At that point, the 
Assembly (composed potentially of the whole demos, and very rarely of less than 
6000 people) held a preliminary vote not on new law proposals, but on whether laws 
could be proposed at all. The institutional set-up was such that the first vote in the 
Assembly was not on a particular solution, but on whether the demos recognised 
that there was a problem that needed solving through legislation. If the vote was 
successful, then volunteers could propose new laws, which had to be widely publi-
cised for a month. At the end of the month, the Assembly would set a date for the 
meeting of the nomothetai to enact new laws. There was however a concern for the 
coherence of the laws. Thus, before enacting new laws, the proposers had to repeal 
all existing contradictory laws, arguing that their new laws were more epitedeion 
(‘appropriate’, ‘fit’ to be laws of the city) than the ones they were repealing, and this 
occurred not in the Assembly, but in a lawcourt, against advocates of the contradic-
tory laws elected by the Assembly at the end of the ‘publicity’ month. Once this 
was done, there would be the session of the nomothetai, and the nomothetai would 
finally approve the new law(s). But if it turned out that the proposer had not followed 
the correct procedure to the letter, had not properly publicised his proposal, or had 
failed to repeal a contradictory existing law, then anyone could bring a public charge 
against him (graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai), and he (and his bill) would be 
judged by another lawcourt, in a form of judicial review. Judicial review stages were 
not concerned exclusively with minute contradictions with existing statutes, but with 
the coherence of the nomoi under examination with the laws in their entirety, with 
their overall ethos.24
It is through such cases of judicial review that we learn the most about actual 
proposals for fiscal reform in the mid-fourth century BCE. This is the case with 
the law of Leptines: the speech Against Leptines was pronounced by Demosthenes 
as an accusation speech in a graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai. It was part of a 
procedure of nomothesia started by Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes with 
the aim of enacting a new law, to replace Leptines’. The law of Leptines had been 
stably enacted (more than one year earlier), had become fully one of the existing 
23 Canevaro (2013a,  b, 2016b). My reconstruction has been challenged by Hansen (2016a, b) (which 
defend Hansen’s own old reconstruction), to which I respond comprehensively in Canevaro (2018b).
24 I make the case for judicial review in Canevaro (2018c).
22 About which see the synthesis in Hansen (1987), and now Canevaro (2018a) on the deliberative 
nature of Athenian political decision making.
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laws, and Leptines was no longer personally liable—his participation in the trial fol-
lowed his election (with others) as syndikos of the existing law, while the accusers 
were attempting to repeal it because repealing contradictory laws was mandated by 
nomothesia before enacting a new one.25 The accusers state that, after repealing this 
law, they would submit their new law to the nomothetai for approval. Demosthenes 
argues that the law of Leptines is me epitedeios: it is a bad law (inferior to the one he 
proposes) because it is inconsistent with specific existing laws that Leptines did not 
repeal in advance, and with the ethos of the laws as a whole, and fully inadequate 
also in tackling the problems it aims to address—the shortage of available liturgists.
3  The liturgical system
Before discussing the law of Leptines, I provide some background on the Athenian 
liturgical system. Liturgies were a form of taxation: the wealthiest Athenians (and, 
in many cases, foreign residents) were obliged to finance and organise particular 
public services to the benefit of the community.26 Unlike normal taxation, however, 
the liturgical system was characterised by a certain level of voluntarism and by some 
discretion about the level of expenditure required, and many liturgies featured some 
form of competition, which incentivised higher expenditure to outdo other liturgists 
and obtain the demos’ gratitude.27
Some evidence indicates that there was a minimum level of wealth under which 
liturgies could not be imposed on someone (cf. Dem. 20.19). If such a threshold 
existed, it would have formally identified a liturgical class.28 Most of the evidence 
however simply states that one’s wealth was sufficient or insufficient, and little else. 
The rule is likely to have been that liturgies should be assigned to the wealthiest 
among those available who could afford them.29 One could avoid a liturgy through 
a procedure called antidosis: he could indicate someone else wealthier and avail-
able who had not been asked. The individual indicated had two options: undertaking 
the liturgy or agreeing to swap his estate with whomever had indicated him.30 The 
number of those who could be subjected to liturgies was therefore variable, but it 
gravitated around the figure of 1200 (out of a citizen population of around 30,000), 
25 For the procedure followed in this speech, see Canevaro (2016a: 12–32, 71–76, b).
26 See the notes throughout this section for secondary literature on liturgies. For an up-to-date introduc-
tory discussion see Migeotte (2014: 524–529) (283–292 on liturgies outside Athens).
27 See Canevaro (2016a, b: 77–98). Christ (2006) highlights occasional attempts to shirk one’s duties, 
but the system seems to have been by and large successful in making the wealthy perform their (expen-
sive) duties. See Liddel (2007: 262–282).
28 Harrison (1971a, b: 235). Ruschenbusch (1985) estimates the threshold at four talents and 1000 drach-
mas.
29 Rhodes (1982, 2006: 331). See also Gabrielsen (1994: 45–53), Christ (2006: 155) and Migeotte 
(2014: 524) notes that land registers must have helped to identify suitable estates.
30 Davies (1971: XXII), MacDowell (1978: 162–164), Ober (1989: 199), Gabrielsen (1987) and Christ 
(1990, 2006: 143–204). Another way to avoid a liturgy was the procedure of diadikasia.
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a figure later institutionalised in the trierarchic symmories.31 Davies argued that in 
the fourth century BCE those who owned a capital of less than three talents never 
undertook liturgies while those who owned more than four talents were bound to be 
selected.32
The Athenians drew a distinction between ordinary and extra-ordinary liturgies.33 
Ordinary liturgies were to do with public festivals, involving considerable expend-
iture and organisational responsibilities:34 the choregoi were in charge of funding 
and preparation of the choruses for the Athenian festivals (Great Dionysia, Lenaia, 
Thargelia, Panathenaia); gymnasiarchs of the races with torches (at the Hephaistia, 
Promethia, Panathenaia); hestiatores of the tribal banquets (at the Great Dionysia, 
Panathenaia, Thesmophoria). There were further liturgies for minor or foreign fes-
tivals, also compulsory for Athenian citizens.35 Extra-ordinary liturgies meant mili-
tary ones: trierarchy (the funding and maintenance of a warship: a trireme), eisphora 
(actually a form of direct taxation for war costs, not precisely a liturgy) and proeis-
phora (the duty to advance the eisphora payment for an entire contributive group36). 
While eisphora was long an occasional contribution, trierarchy became soon an 
annual liturgy. Some liturgies were for metics only (foreign residents: e.g. skaphe-
phoria—metics were meant to bring to the Panathenaia bowls full of offerings—or 
connected to particular cults reserved to them).37 Some were reserved for citizens, 
such as the trierarchy.38 But most ordinary liturgies were open to both categories.39 
Davies calculated that there were at least 97 liturgies (excluding dubious cases) in a 
normal year, and 118 in Panathenaic years (one year in four had more liturgies on 
account of the festival of the Great Panathenaia).40
Choregies were the most important and most expensive of ordinary liturgies: Lys. 
21.1 shows that they could cost up to half a talent—the speaker argues that he spent 
31 See Rhodes (1982: 1–19), Gabrielsen (1994: 178–182), van Wees (2011: 111–112); contra Davies 
(1981: 26–27), Kron (2011: 129), who argue (implausibly) that they were 300.
32 Davies (1971: XXIV, 1981: 28–37). Cf. Rhodes (1982: 5), Gabrielsen (1994: 45–53, 176–82) and 
Migeotte (2014: 524).
33 See Migeotte (2014: 524). Ordinary liturgies were called enkyklioi, a term found also in two inscrip-
tions (IG  II2 1147 and SEG 23.78), which probably derived from the circular choruses funded by many 
of these liturgies; see Wilson (2000: 332) n. 22.
34 See Lys. 21.1–5 for choregies between 300 and 3000 drachmas; IG  II2 417 col. 1 l. 5 for eutaxia 
between 50 and 100 drachmas; cf. Davies (1971: 21–22; 1981) and Pritchard (2015: 34). On organisa-
tional duties see e.g. Lys 19.58; cf. Hansen (1999: 110–112) and Wilson (2000: 50–108).
35 Davies (1971: XVII–XXXI, 1981), Wilson (2000: 11–108) and Makres (1994) provide comprehen-
sive treatments of ordinary liturgies.. Cf. Migeotte (2014: 524–529).
36 See Wallace (1989) with further bibliography, and particularly de Ste. Croix (1953), Brun (1983), 
Hansen (1999: 110) and Christ (2006).
37 E.g. Whitehead (1977: 88–89).
38 E.g. Whitehead (1977: 81–103, n. 85); Gabrielsen (1994: 61). Contra Jordan (2001). Two possible 
exceptions: the Pamphilus of Dem. 21.163 and IG  II2 1612 ll. 156–85, see MacDowell (1990: 382–383).
39 See Dem. 10.18 and Lys. 12.20; Whitehead (1977: 80–82), Hansen (1999: 110–111); cf. Wilson 
(2000: 28–31) about the Lenaia.
40 Davies (1967) and Pritchard (2015: 34–39, 44–49).
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14,900 drachmas (almost two and a half talents) over eight years in choregies.41 The 
most prestigious and expensive military liturgy was the trierarchy, which involved the 
upkeep of a trireme for one year. The trierarch was also meant to command the trireme, 
under the orders of the strategoi (generals), but had the option of appointing (and paying 
for) a commander to replace him.42 A trierarchy cost approximately one talent, a very 
substantial figure (Lys. 21.2, Lys, 32.24, Dem. 21.155), so expensive that the system was 
at one point reformed to allow for two individuals to share a trierarchy,43 and later further 
reformed to distribute the burden among symmoriai (contributive groups).44
Eisphora was a direct tax—not a liturgy proper, but a military tax that developed 
side by side with the liturgies and with the trierarchy and conditioned their organisa-
tion. It is often mentioned together with liturgies as evidence of the public spirited-
ness of a litigant (Isae. 7.39–40; Dem. 28.4; Lys. 20.23; 21.3; 19.43), because it was 
understood as a duty of the wealthier citizens and (for a specific portion of them) 
metics that brought with it honour and recognition.45 In its Classical version, it 
was originally a sporadic tax imposed on the wealthiest, but was transformed, from 
347/6 onwards, into an annual tax meant to collect an overall figure of ten talents, on 
top of which an extra-ordinary further eisphora could be added.46
The information on the earliest phase of eisphora (attested from 428 BCE in 
Thuc. 3.19.1, and possibly earlier in IG  I3 52, ll. b15–19) is patchy. Some argue 
that it was already calculated (as after 378/7 BCE) by applying a particular rate 
(decided each time by the Assembly) to the timema, the estimated capital of each 
of the wealthier citizens liable to it. Others believe that the  calculation based on 
timema was introduced in 378/7, whereas earlier on all those liable paid the same 
amount (which varied depending on the total needed).47 It is also unclear how many 
Athenians were liable in this phase, with estimates between 6000 and 1000.48 It is 
also possible that the number changed depending on need.49
41 Wilson (2008: 111–114) estimates the cost of the Dionysia: ca. 415 BCE, liturgies contributed 
between 10 and fifteen talents to the Great Dionysia (cf. Pritchard 2015: 40–8). In the fourth century 
BCE, they contributed around seven talents and 2000 drachmas to the Great Panathenaia (Pritchard 
2015: 28–40).
42 For a comprehensive discussion of trierarchy, see Gabrielsen (1994) and Gabrielsen (2014) on the 
economics of Greek navies. See also Morrison et al. (2000: 107–126), Migeotte (2014: 527–529). For 
the prestige of trierarchy, see Liddel (2007: 270–274).
43 Lys. 31.24–26; Dem. 21.154; cf. Gabrielsen (1994: 173–176).
44 See Pritchard (2015: 99–113) on the cost of the fleet.
45 See Liddel (2007: 276). See in general de Ste. Croix (1953), Thomsen (1964), Brun (1983), Picard 
(2000: 152–156), Christ (2007), Flament (2007: 88–94, 191–192, 202–206, 222–223), Poddighe (2010) 
and Migeotte (2014: 518–524). It is found also in other cities, see Migeotte (2014: 278–283).
46 IG  II2 244 ll. 12–13; 505 ll. 14–17; Din. 1.69. Cf. Thomsen (1964: 238–242), Brun (1983: 54–55), 
Hansen (1999: 112), Christ (2006: 147).
47 Cf. de Ste. Croix (1953: 34 n. 20), Thomsen (1964: 183), Davies (1971: 593; 1981: 146), Brun (1983: 
9), Rhodes (1994: 193), Christ (2006: 148, 2007: 53–60) and Poddighe (2010).
48 Ste. Croix (1953: 33): 6000 plus 1000 metics, Jones (1957: 29: 6000) and Davies (1981: 141: 1000–
1200).
49 Liddel (2007: 275).
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In 378/7 the system was thoroughly reformed, with the introduction of symmo-
ries: 100 contributive groups (Cleidemus FGrH 323 F 8),50 with around 15 wealthy 
contributors in each51—the figure to be collected was divided among the groups,52 to 
which the rate established by the Assembly was applied, possibly with proportional 
taxation for each individual within them based on the declared timema.53 After 378/7 
ca. eisphora was therefore collected from the wealthiest ca. 1500 citizens. The actual 
figure may in fact have been slightly higher, in the region of 2000. The eisphora was 
therefore paid by a larger group than the ‘liturgical class’ (around 1200 individuals), 
but nevertheless by the wealthiest Athenians.54 Historians have also calculated that it 
was collected at a rate normally higher than 0.25% of the total timemata (the assessed 
overall capital of all contributors). It is less clear how the individual timemata, which 
determined the figure to be paid, were assessed each time. Dem. 27.7 seems to suggest 
that the figure of each timema was negotiated, in a more or less formal agreement, 
between individual contributor and his symmory, with some room for flexibility.55
With the law of Periander of 358/7 BCE (Dem. 47.21), trierarchies were also 
organised in symmories:56 20 symmories of around 60 citizens each, for a total of 
1200 contributors.57 This new trierarchical system institutionalised the number of 
liturgists. This reform is a reflexion of the difficulties in finding enough trierarchs 
encountered at the time of the Social War. These symmories were probably created 
ex novo, and were different from those of eisphora. The different number of sym-
mories in the new system confirm this.58 Some scholars have argued, with various 
nuances, that the two systems were in fact identical, but that only the wealthiest 300 
performed the trierarchy.59 Gabrielsen has however unequivocally demonstrated that 
at least 1200 individuals with fortunes over 3–4 talents, available to serve personally 
as trierarchs, were necessary for the trierarchical system to work at all.60 Rhodes 
also notes that passages such as Dem. 20.28, which state that not all that paid the 
eisphora were also liable to the trierarchy,61 are more easily understood if we envi-
sion two separate systems of symmories, with the members of the eisphora sym-
mories being not 1200, as in the trierarchy symmories, but more (possibly between 
50 Philochorus FGrH 328 F 41; Hyp. frr. 102, 149, 152 Jensen.
51 For a detailed argument for these figures see Canevaro (2016a: 51 n. 211).
52 For opinions on the introduction of this system see Thomsen (1964), MacDowell (1986), Hansen 
(1999: 113), Rhodes (2006: 330) and Poddighe (2010).
53 The overall total of all the timemata for eisphora taxation in 379/8 was, according Plb. 2.62.7, 5750 
talents; it was in 354/3, according to Dem. 14.19, 6000 talents. Poddighe (2010) argues instead that the 
timema system was effective from the beginning of eisphora. Cf. Migeotte (2014: 20–22). For accounts 
of the debates about whether progressivity applied within this system see Ste. Croix (1953: 35, 69–70), 
Thomsen (1964: 16–23), Brun (1983: 10–14), Christ (2007: 59) and Migeotte (2014: 521).
54 Rhodes (1982: 8).
55 Liddel (2007: 276). Cf. Poddighe (2010), Migeotte (2014: 519–522).
56 Dem. 47.21–22, 44; Dem. 14.16–17; Dem. 18.102–104; Dem. 21.154–155 with Gabrielsen (1994: 
182–199).
57 Cf. Rhodes (1981: 680–681), MacDowell (1986) and Gabrielsen (1994: 182–193).
58 F.A. Wolf (1789: CI–CXVI), Boeckh (1886 I, pp. 609, 615, 618, 647), Thumser (1880: 63), Kahrstedt 
(1910: 224), de Ste Croix (1953: 45), Jones (1957: 28), Thomsen (1964: 88–89).
59 Ruschenbusch (1978, 1985), Mossé (1979: 31–42) and MacDowell (1986: 440).
60 Gabrielsen (1994: 45–53, 176–182).
61 See Canevaro 2016a, b: 238–239.
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1500 and 2000).62 The existence of two parallel systems both called symmories 
is not problematic. The recently published Grain Tax Law of Agyrrhius about the 
dodekate and the pentekoste taxes in Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros stipulates that 
3000 medimnoi-worth portions of the tax should be collected by symmories of six 
individuals, responsible then to the city for handing over the grain (ll. 31–6).63 This 
provision shows that symmory (symmoria) was a generic term applied to all kinds of 
contributive groups, and not to a specific one. There is no need therefore to believe 
that every time the word appears it must refer to the  same system of contributive 
groups (symmoriai). In fact, at Dem. 20.23 Demosthenes proposed to create a fur-
ther system for the ordinary liturgies—these would be different symmories, differ-
ently organised (see Sect. 4).
Demosthenes proposed a further reform of the system in 354/3 BCE (Dem. 14): 
that the number of contributors should be expanded from 1200 to 2000, and that 
the rate of trierachic contributions should be proportional to the wealth of the indi-
vidual contributors. His proposal was probably modelled around the symmories for 
eisphora, but it did not pass.64 More than a decade later, in 340 BCE, at the outset of 
the war with Philip II of Macedon, when Demosthenes was in a position of strength, 
he managed to have another reform approved, which transferred the burden of the 
trierarchies completely or for the most part on to a smaller group of the three hun-
dred wealthiest citizens (Dem. 18.102–109; Aeschin. 3.222; Din. 1.42; Hyp. fr. 134 
Jensen).65
Demosthenes’ proposals are symptomatic of the crisis of the liturgical system, 
with the Athenians considering options for reform. War and economic crisis reduced 
the number of available liturgists with a capital of over 3–4 talents (by impover-
ishing many Athenians, also from the upper echelons of society), and must have 
reduced even further the number of those who undertook liturgies voluntarily. In that 
context, the system was often criticised, particularly for how burdensome ordinary 
liturgies were: some argued that military liturgies should have priority over festival 
ones, others that the entire system needed reforming. Demosthenes himself, at Dem. 
20.26, argues that the aim of ordinary liturgies is to provide enjoyment for the audi-
ence, whereas the aim of military liturgies is the safety of the city; that the effects of 
ordinary liturgies are limited to fewer people who take part in the festivals, and to 
specific periods of time.66 Lycurgus (1.139–40) argues that the wealthy should not 
ask for the city’s gratitude because of services such as choregies and horse breeding, 
which anyway provide them and their families (more than the city) with advantages 
and rewards (crowns). They should ask for gratitude for the trierarchies, for build-
ing the walls, for donations to support the war effort. Aristotle in the Politics (1309a 
14–20) also argues that democracies would do better to spare the wealthy from the 
62 Rhodes (1982: 5–11). Cf. Gabrielsen (1994: 182–193), pace Hansen (1999: 112–115).
63 See for this law Stroud (1998), and the different interpretations of some of its provisions in Harris 
(1999) and Faraguna (1999); Jakab (2007) (followed by Faraguna’s critical response), Moreno (2003); 
Magnetto et al. (2010).
64 Cf. Rhodes (1981: 680; 2006: 332).
65 Completely: Jones (1957: 88); Davies (1971: XXIX); Ruschenbusch (1978: 283). For the most part: 
Gabrielsen (1994: 153–158); Hansen (1999: 172–173).
66 See Canevaro (2016a, b: 236).
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expensive yet useless choregies and lampadarchiai. Demetrius of Phaleron asserts 
that for many families the tripod of the winner in a choregic competition is nothing 
more than that last libation of their exhausted fortune, and a cenotaph of many a 
fallen family (FGrH 228 F 25).67
4  What did the law of Leptines say, and why?
We turn now to the law of Leptines. It was probably enacted in 356/5, in the last 
months of the Social War.68 In those months, the Athenians, financially prostrated 
and on the way to defeat, enacted various measures to promote diplomatic relations 
and trade as sources of prosperity for the city, as part of medium- and long-term pol-
icies to restore the city’s economic and diplomatic (rather than military) supremacy. 
At the same time, the Athenians were plagued by a lack of resources to run the state-
machinery in the short term. We have several examples of attempts to replenish the 
state coffers and ensure the working of the institutions of the state (see Sect. 1). The 
law of Leptines has similar aims.
It is clear that the law stated that ‘no one of the citizens, the isoteleis and the 
foreigners is exempt’ and that ‘in the future it is not permitted to grant an exemp-
tion’—Demosthenes’ quotes verbatim this part of the law already at Dem. 20.2, and 
repeats it often throughout the speech. The problem is: what kinds of exemptions are 
we talking about? And exemptions from what exactly?
MacDowell identified five kinds of ateleia in Athens:69 1) ateleia from liturgies, 
which could be given as a honorary grant, but also derive automatically from hav-
ing performed a liturgy the year before, or a trierarchy in the two previous years 
(orphans and heiresses also had ateleia from liturgies)70; 2) ateleia from military 
service, due to appointment to certain offices (Dem. 21.15, 39.16, [Dem.] 59.27); 
3) ateleia from the obligation of serving as public arbitrator in one’s sixtieth year, 
if one was away or in office ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 53.5); 4) property in the silver mines 
was ateles (exempt) when one’s estate was assessed for antidosis (Dem. 42.18); 5) a 
67 See Wilson (2000: 264–271).
68 See Canevaro (2016a, b: 8–11).
69 MacDowell (2004: 127–128). Cf. Henry (1983: 241–243) and Migeotte (2014: 458–467). On ateleia 
outside Athens see Knoepfler (2001: 55–60) (for central Greece), Rubinstein (2009), Migeotte (2014: 
102–119).
70 See Dem. 20.8, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 56.3 and Dem. 50.9 for the rule that those who performed a liturgy 
were exempt the next year. A similar rule gave a two years exemption those who performed a trierarchy 
(Isae. 7.38; cf. Lys. 19.29, 21.5, Isae. 5.41). See Davies (1981: 16–17), Rhodes (1982: 3), Christ (1990: 
149 n. 9), Gabrielsen (1994: 85–87), Van Wees (2004: 308 n. 31). The exemption was from all liturgies, 
not just from the trierarchy, see Canevaro (2016a, b: 222–223). It is unclear when the two years interval 
was introduced. Pace Karvounis (1999), Dem. 20.8 does not contradict Isae. 7.38 (it refers to normal 
liturgies, not to trierarchies), and it stands to reason that the exemption after an ordinary liturgy should 
be shorter than that after the more expensive trierarchy. See Lys. 32.24 and Dem. 14.16 for orphans, heir-
esses and cleruchs.
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metic could have ateleia from the metic tax.71 In addition to these, we find (convinc-
ingly restored) in an inscription (IG  II3 393 l. 5), at [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42 and at Dem. 
20.60 the expression ateleia hapanton or panton (exemption from everything), or 
the word ateleia unqualified. MacDowell and others have convincingly argued that 
such an exemption would cover all sorts of obligations, customs and duties, being 
therefore particularly valuable to traders who would be exempt from harbour taxes 
and other taxes on imports and exports.72
At Dem. 20.29–40 Demosthenes wants to give the impression that the law abol-
ishes all kinds of ateleia, including on trade taxes and customs. His first example 
of deserving benefactor who would suffer on account of Leptines’ law is Leucon 
of Bosporus, the sovereign of a kingdom particularly rich in grain, which provided 
Athens with a considerable proportion of its essential grain imports (ca. 400,000 
medimnoi, according to Demosthenes).73 Leucon had been exempted, presumably, 
from everything—not just from liturgies (as a non-resident of Athens, that would 
have been meaningless), but also from commercial taxes.74 Demosthenes quotes at 
Dem. 20.29 the key phrase of Leptines’ law (‘no one of the citizens, the isoteleis 
and the foreigners is exempt’) and complains that it does not specify from what pre-
cisely citizens, isoteleis and foreigners cannot be exempt. He thus implies that the 
law of Leptines will affect all kinds of exemptions. Later Demosthenes (20.31–32) 
summarizes the benefits that Leucon has bestowed upon Athens: not only is he the 
biggest source of grain for Athens, but he has given ateleia from export taxes (3.3%) 
both in Bosporus and Theodosia to all traders, regardless of their origin, who buy 
grain and bring it to Athens. This ateleia is important because it encourages mer-
chants to sell Bosporean grain to Athens (and sell it cheaper). He then argues that 
it is unthinkable that Leucon would suffer being deprived of his ateleia in Athens 
but still allow the Athenians to retain theirs in his kingdom. Demosthenes attempts 
to equate the exemptions Leucon has in Athens with those that the Athenians have 
in the kingdom of Bosporus, and implies that Leptines’ law will cancel all of Leu-
con’s exemptions, even those on harbour, import and export taxes. He relies here 
on the same economic logic espoused by Xenophon (see Sect. 1), confident that it 
will resonate with the judges. The need to increase trade to fix the economy must 
have been widely felt, and this topic must have been in those years central to end-
less speeches in the Assembly, quite like talk of growth never leaves us these days in 
Europe and the US. Demosthenes uses the widely-felt need to secure a large volume 
of trade (and a comfortable provision of grain) against the law of Leptines, implying 
71 On metics and the metic tax, see Canevaro (2016a, b: 223–225) with previous scholarship. This 
exemption was normally called isoteleia, but some inscriptions show that it could also be called ateleia 
[cf. Henry (1983: 244–245)].
72 See Henry (1983: 241–243), Knöpfler (2001: 56 n. 179, 58 n. 193), MacDowell (2004: 127–128); 
contra Lambert (2006: 136 n. 99), but see Canevaro (2016a: 56 n. 235).
73 For a thorough discussion of Leucon and of Athenian grain imports, which summarises previous 
scholarship, see Canevaro (2016a, b: 240–261).
74 Such an exemption from import and export taxes matched what Leucon had granted the Athenians. 
Cf. Schol. Dem. 20.113 Dilts; Hagamajer Allen (2003: 236), MacDowell (2004: 128–129), Oliver (2007: 
22–23, 30–37). Engen (2010: 284) believes (wrongly) that the exemption from commercial taxes would 
have been applied only if Leucon had sailed himself for Athens, but see Canevaro (2016a, b: 249–251), 
Bresson (2000: 148), Oliver (2007: 22–37).
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that the exemptions Leucon loses with Leptines’ law are equivalent to those that the 
Athenians will lose as a result of it.
The argument is effective. But is it also truthful? Is it true that Leptines’ law 
affected exemptions from everything, because it did not specify what kinds of 
exemptions it abolished?75 In fact, Demosthenes’ himself is clear at Dem. 20.18–28 
that Leptines’ prime concern was to make sure that there would be enough people 
available to shoulder the ca. 100 liturgies to be performed every year. Essential pub-
lic services and the orderly running of the Athenian state depended on this. Leptines 
was trying to solve this problem of shortage of liturgists by abolishing exemptions 
from liturgies. This has nothing to do with exemptions from harbour, imports and 
exports taxes. And, in fact, at Dem. 20.128 Demosthenes quotes verbatim another 
clause of Leptines’ law (hopos an hoi plousiotatoi leitourgosi: ‘so that the wealthiest 
shoulder the liturgies’) which makes clear that the law applied only to exemptions 
from liturgies, not to all exemptions.76 This clause states explcitly that the purpose 
of the law was to make sure that the richest (among the 1,200 liable) would shoulder 
the liturgies, and therefore limits the scope of the prohibitions ‘no one of the citi-
zens, the isoteleis and the foreigners is exempt’ and ‘in the future it is not permitted 
to grant an exemption’ only to the exemptions from liturgies, not to all exemptions.77 
Demosthenes at Dem. 20.29–40 wants to give the impression that all of Leucon’s 
exemptions were abolished, but this impression is deceptive, and Demosthenes him-
self implicitly admits this when he suggests at Dem. 20.40 that Leucon may now be 
asked to perform a liturgy, or challenged in an antidosis: an absurd suggestion given 
that Leucon was not resident in Athens. The issue here was exemptions from litur-
gies, and from liturgies alone.
The text of the law, reconstructed from various quotations scattered throughout 
the speech (Dem. 20.2, 29, 97, 127, 128, 170) referred only to liturgies:
Leptines proposed: so that the wealthiest shoulder the liturgies, no one of the 
citizens, the isoteleis and the foreigners is exempt except the descendants of 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and in the future it is not permitted to grant an 
exemption.
So Leptines was concerned specifically with liturgies, because, apparently, there 
was a shortage of available liturgists, and the wealthiest did not shoulder them as 
they should, so liturgies had become a burden for the poorer members of the liturgi-
cal class. What was Leptines’ solution then?
While at Dem. 20.29–40 Demosthenes gives the impression that the law has 
wider application than it actually has (and applies also to commercial exemptions), 
at Dem. 20.18–28 he argues that it fails to solve even the problem for which it was 
75 As hypothesised e.g. by MacDowell (2004: 128) and Kremmydas (2012: 53).
76 Final clauses with hopos an are often used in inscriptions to state the aim of the measure (e.g. IG  II2 
42 ll. 6–7 and 21–2; IG  II2 43 ll. 9–10; IG  II2 141 ll. 20–1).
77 It was not, therefore, a redistributive measure meant to unburden the poor [see Canevaro (2016a, b: 
66–67)], pace Burke (2002), because the liturgical burden was shifted within the same top 4% of the citi-
zens, and had nothing to do with the poor.
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conceived. In that case, he deceptively exaggerated the consequences of the law; 
in this case he deceptively underestimates them, using figures, quite like modern 
politicians, to blind the judges to the unwarranted assumptions of his analysis. He 
states that liturgies are performed part by citizens and part by metics. None of these 
are exempt anyway from the trierarchy and from the special war contributions (eis-
phora).78 He then argues that the law of Leptines would not add much to the num-
ber of available liturgists, because the richest are anyway exempted because of their 
trierarchies, while those who do not own enough (3–4 talents) are automatically 
exempted. Whether they have an honorary exemption or not, these categories are 
always exempted anyway. So, the law of Leptines will not add anyone from these 
two groups. How about the metics? Perhaps some. Demosthenes claims that there 
may be 16, 20 even perhaps 30 more potential liturgists (metics and a few citizens) 
that will lose their honorary exemption. Such a small number will not change much: 
the shortage will remain, and this small gain cannot compensate the reputational 
(and commercial) damage the law of Leptines will produce.
Demosthenes’ argument is superficially convincing.79 But can we really believe 
that an experienced politician like Leptines would enact such an ineffective law? 
Leptines’ purpose was explicitly to remedy the shortage of potential liturgists, and to 
move the burden from the poorest among the 1200 to the richest. If Demosthenes is 
right, his law would produce a meagre 30 more liturgists (we could even double this, 
to account for Demosthenes’ interest in underestimating this number; but it would 
still make little difference: these would anyway be exempted every second year), 
but create no transfer of the burden to the richest among the 1200, who would still 
be exempted because of the trierarchies. There is however one assumption in Dem-
osthenes’ discussion that is not confirmed by any of the quotations and paraphrases 
of the law throughout the speech. It is a tacit assumption that never comes to the 
surface, but determines Demosthenes’ entire argument. This assumption is that Lep-
tines’ law applied only to honorary exemptions.
The law states that ‘no one of the citizens, the isoteleis and the foreigners is 
exempt, except for the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton’ and that ‘in the 
future it is not permitted to grant an exemption’. It specifies that the purpose of the 
law is that in the future the richest may perform the liturgies. So it forbids further 
grants of ateleia, it abolishes all exemptions from liturgies, but does not state any-
where that only honorary exemptions are to be abolished. This is Demosthenes’ own 
assumption. As the law is phrased, it would also affect the exemptions that resulted 
from having performed a liturgy the previous year, or a trierarchy in the two pre-
vious years (and possibly even during the same year). It would mean that, against 
Demosthenes’ claims, the richest would not always be exempted from the liturgies 
because they are trierarchs. They would still be liable, whether they are performing 
78 This statement is strictly speaking incorrect, because we have epigraphical evidence of a grant of ate-
leia from the eisphora. See IG  II2 141 ll. 29–36, with Canevaro (2016a, b: 20) [pace Migeotte (2014: 
146)].
79 And it has been found convincing by many scholars, e.g. Sandys (1890: XI–XVIII), Schaefer (1885–
1887: I, pp. 353, 391), Momigliano (1975: 247–248), Sealey (1993: 126), Badian (2000: 27–28), Burke 
(2002: 177–179), Rhodes (2006: 332), Worthington (2013: 78–79).
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or have performed a trierarchy or not, as long as they are still demonstrably richer 
than someone else of the 1200 (otherwise antidosis was available). Likewise, a very 
rich man who was choregos the year before would not be exempted from service if 
he is still demonstrably richer than someone else. If this is correct, Leptines’ law 
would have precisely the effects Leptines claimed it had, freeing many recent tri-
erarchs (see below) and 100 recent liturgists every year for further liturgical ser-
vice, securing a steady provision of liturgists, and making sure that the richest would 
always be liturgists first.
Demosthenes does not explicitly argue against this interpretation; he just sup-
presses it. But it surfaces in his account, as an echo of Leptines’ own arguments: at 
Dem. 20.20 he argues that there are not even five metics with honorary exemptions. 
He states: ‘If he comes up with five, I admit I am talking nonsense. Let us assume 
that I am, that more than that number of metics will perform liturgies if the law is 
enacted and that no citizen will be exempt for serving as trierarch’ (trans. Harris, 
my italics). The per absurdum admission ‘that no citizen will be exempt for serving 
as trierarch’ seems to come straight out of Leptines’ own arguments, and has noth-
ing to do with the number of exempted metics (metics cannot even be trierarchs). 
Demosthenes hides it straightway with a reference to the dishonour of the city. He 
then carries on to argue that there can be 16, 20, 30 new potential liturgists at the 
most. But surely, if ‘no citizen will be exempt for serving as trierarch’ the number of 
additional potential trierarchs will not be 30, it will be many more (see below).
This is also confirmed by what Demosthenes states at Dem. 20.26: he states 
that one of the arguments of the defence is that most of the wealthy get richer ana-
pauomenous, to which Demosthenes retorts that the wealth they accumulate is use-
ful for the whole city, because it allows them to undertake expensive liturgies such 
as the trierarchies. The participle anapauomenous refers to the exemptions, and the 
verb anapauo, in the middle, means ‘to rest’, ‘to recover’, and therefore can only 
refer to a temporary pause from the liturgical burden. It cannot refer to honorary 
exemptions, which are not temporary, but forever (they are not, that is, pauses). The 
fact that Demosthenes uses here anapauomenous while reporting Leptines’ argu-
ments is further evidence that the law of Leptines was meant to abolish all exemp-
tions from liturgies, also the temporary exemptions (one or two years long) obtained 
after performing a liturgy. This would have had huge consequences for the workings 
of the liturgical system.
It appears then that all exemptions from liturgies, not only the honorary ones, 
were abolished by the law. Demosthenes tries to suppress this, in order to argue that 
the law is ineffective—it fails to do what it was designed for. He can then argue that 
the meagre benefits of the law are easily offset by the enormous reputational damage 
for the city, and by the medium- and long-term disadvantages it will bring in terms 
of trade. But even while arguing all this, he concedes that Leptines’ argument is in 
fact that trierarchs will no longer be exempted from the liturgies. Later, when dis-
cussing individual meritorious benefactors, Demosthenes uses the opposite strategy, 
and suggests (without proving it) that the law of Leptines may have wider applica-
tion, and affect also exemptions from harbour, imports and exports taxes, with ter-
rible consequences for the grain trade (see above).
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Demosthenes wants to have it both ways, he lies and suppresses. His is an accusa-
tion speech, and his purpose is to have the law repealed. But the problems addressed 
by the law of Leptines were real. After the Social War, with an ongoing economic 
crisis and general impoverishment, it is likely that it may have become difficult for 
the relatively less wealthy among the richest 1200 Athenians to find enough money 
to perform every second year expensive liturgies. It is even likely that some of them 
may have dropped under the 3 talents limit, and even those that did not may have 
been closer to 3 than to 4 talents. If, as Demosthenes admits and Leptines must have 
stressed, the richest were often exempted because of the trierarchies, finding enough 
liturgists must have become problematic, and the burden of the liturgies must have 
been overwhelming for many who were previously quite comfortable with it.
So what was the size of the problem that Leptines attempted to solve with his 
law? Each year ca. 100 liturgists had to be found, out of a pool of the richest 4% 
of the Athenian population—ca. 1200 citizens with a wealth of at least 3–4 talents 
(see Section 3). The task does not in itself seem daunting, yet we must keep in mind 
that not all these 1200 potential liturgists were really available. First, no one could 
perform more than one liturgy per year, so those that were trierarchs in a given year 
were automatically exempt from ordinary liturgies. Second, ca. 100 people were 
exempt because they had performed an ordinary liturgy the previous year. Third, 
those that had performed a trierarchy in the previous two years were also exempt. 
Moreover, no one could be asked to perform the same ordinary liturgy twice, some 
liturgies had a higher age threshold (i.e. liturgists had to be older to perform them, 
e.g. Aeschin. 1.11),80 fortunes of appropriate size that happened to be in the hands 
of heiresses or orphans were also exempt (Dem. 14.16), and some must have been 
exempt because of honorary exemptions.
How many people were exempt because of the trierarchy? Athens had in the 350s 
in the region of 300 triremes, but no more than 250 were serviceable in a given 
year.81 Of course, in a calm year, much fewer ships would have been in commis-
sion—Gabrielsen estimates 60, possibly as a minimum.82 Therefore, some trier-
archs would not have actually sailed and would have been, as Gabrielsen describes 
them, ‘nominal’. However, before the reform of Periander and the creation of the 
trierarchic symmories, all serviceable ships, whether ‘active’ during the year or 
not, were assigned to trierarchs, so between 200 trierarchs (a very conservative esti-
mate) and 300 (accounting for ca. one-fifth of the trierarchies performed jointly) 
80 Aeschin. 1.9–11 with Gabrielsen (1994: 85), Wilson (2000: 55–56).
81 IG  II2 (1611) l.9: 283 ships in 357/356; IG  II2 (1613) l. 302: 349 in 353/352; IG  II2 (1627) ll. 266–
269, 275–278: 392 triremes + 18 quadriremes = 410 in 330/329; 360 triremes + 50 quadriremes + 2 
quinqueremes = 412 in 325/324. See Ashton (1979), Gabrielsen (2014: 39).
82 Gabrielsen (1994: 216); see also Davies (1981: 16); cf. Pritchard (2015: 109) for the 370s. It should 
be noted however that the events of the Against Leptines take place at the end of the Social War, after 
years of intense naval activity.
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were nominated each year.83 There is no evidence suggesting that only ‘active’ (as 
opposed to ‘nominal’) trierarchs were exempted for the following two years. In fact, 
if only ca. 60 ‘active’ trierarchs served in a given year, and if only these received the 
exemption, it is hard to see how finding trierarchs for the fleet, out of a pool of 1200 
men, may have ever been a problem, or a particular burden in the long run, to the 
extent that reform became necessary. As ‘nominal’ trierarchs were assigned ships 
and were responsible for their maintenance, whether they were commissioned or 
not, it is likely that they all received exemption.84 The law of Leptines was enacted 
shortly after Periander’s reform, towards the end of a burdensome war, and it is 
likely that the trierarchic exemptions affecting the selection for liturgies had origi-
nated under, and were still conditioned by, the old system.85
In this scenario, every year at least 200–250 potential liturgists were exempt because 
they were trierarchs. Another 400–500 were exempt because they had been trierarchs in 
the two previous years, because trierarchies were followed by two years of exemption 
from all liturgies. These were generally the richest among the 1200. If we add all these 
categories of exemption up, it becomes clear why Leptines proposed his law: out of 
1200 potential liturgists, over 800 or 900 could be exempted in any given year because 
of liturgical service they were performing or had performed in the past, or because they 
were orphans, or heiresses, or had been granted honorary exemptions.86
The scenario following the reform of Periander and the creation of 20 symmo-
ries of around 60 citizens each for a total of 1200 contributors—which must have 
affected Leptines’ longer-term thinking—is more difficult to unpack. The naval 
records of the epimeletai ton neorion (‘superintendents of the dockyards’) show that 
ships, after the reform, were still assigned to individual trierarchs or (more rarely) 
to syntrierarchs. It is unclear whether the ships not in commission were still allo-
cated to particular trierarchs or were simply left in the general care of a particular 
symmory. If they were still allocated to particular trierarchs (in addition to falling 
within the remit of a symmory), then the scenario would not be different from that 
described above, and all trierarchs (‘nominal’ and ‘active’) would be exempted. 
If, on the other hand, the ships not in commission were left in the generic care of 
the symmories,87 it is unclear who would receive the exemption: only the ‘active’ 
trierarchs or all the trierarchs/synteleis (contributors)? In the first case, we would 
be talking, on Gabrielsen assumption of sixty ships in commission, of ca. 80 per 
year (accounting for syntrierarchies), and it would be hard to see how this may have 
created difficulties with finding enough liturgists (or trierarchs, of whom there was 
also a shortage, as shown in Dem. 14.16–18). And, moreover, there is no evidence 
83 Gabrielsen (1994: 177–178). See also Gabrielsen (1994: 81): ‘It seems likely, therefore, that all ves-
sels, whether in commission or at home at the beginning of the year, were allotted among the newly 
designated trierarchs’. On the difference between ‘nominal’ and ‘active’ trierarchs see Gabrielsen (1994: 
77–78).
84 Gabrielsen (1994: 87) seems agnostic about this, but at p. 178 he decisively states that all trierarchs 
(‘nominal’ and ‘active’) were exempted for the following two years.
85 This discussion complements Canevaro (2016a, b: 58–59) and makes the basis for the estimates I pro-
vide there explicit.
86 Gabrielsen (1994: 177–178) therefore posits an average four years cycle for liturgists and trierarchs 
and calculates the necessary pool from it.
87 This is the position of Gabrielsen (1994: 77–78).
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for a substantive distinction between the two categories, which would underpin the 
assumption that the exemption was reserved for the ‘trierarchs’ as opposed to the 
synteleis (members of the symmories contributing together).88
Gabrielsen is convinced that it is unthinkable that all the 1200 members of the 
symmories may have received a two-year exemption—this would have required 
3600 potential members.89 Yet Dem. 14.16 makes clear that, at least in the period 
that we are discussing, it was in fact proving impossible to find each year 1200 
members for the twenty symmories—Demosthenes states that there were each year 
around 800 people exempted (for various reasons, including being ‘ineligible’, ady-
natos). Thus, only ca. 400 at that point actually joined the symmories each year, 
and this is the reason for which Demosthenes, in the speech On the Symmories (14), 
proposes to extend the number of eligible candidates to 2000, so as to provide 1200 
actual members of the symmories each year. Gabrielsen convincingly interprets the 
adynatoi mentioned at Dem. 14.16 as ‘legally ineligible’, because, for instance, they 
were performing other liturgies. By the same token, it is possible and likely (given 
the high number, 800) that the adynatoi included also those exempted because they 
had performed a liturgy in the previous year, or a trierarchy in the previous two.90 
If the exemption protected people also from joining the symmories as contributors 
(synteleis), not just from being ‘active’ trierarchs, then it becomes easy to account 
for the difficulty in finding 1200 members of the symmories, and for the very high 
number of the exempted, 800. We have very limited evidence for how many synte-
leis took care of a commissioned ship, and the figure provided by Dem. 18.104—
sixteen—is probably an exaggeration. Hyp. fr. 134 states that before the further 
reform of 340 trierarchies were performed by groups of six or seven men (synteleis, 
rather than actual trierarchs), and Gabrielsen has shown that this figure is probably 
reliable (although there must have been ships with fewer synteleis).91 Using again 
Gabrielsen’s estimate of 60 ships in commission in a given year, the actual synteleis 
involved in active trierarchies each year as members of the symmories would be ca. 
360 (assuming six synteleis per ship), strikingly consistent with the figure of 400 
actual members of the symmories provided by Dem. 14.16. If these men were then 
exempted for two years, this would more or less exhaust the pool of 1200 available 
liturgists, make unavailable for liturgical service all the richest in the city, and make 
it impossible for the city to find consistently enough people for the new trierarchical 
symmories, which theoretically required 1200 members (even accounting for a sig-
nificant number of voluntary liturgists forsaking their exemptions).
These scenarios are all quite speculative, and the state of the evidence does not 
allow to formulate anything but very hypothetical estimates based on informed 
assumptions about the institutional set-up of the liturgical and trierarchical systems. 
But, in all these scenarios, it is clear that the pool of available liturgists was rather 
small, and it is easy to see how it may have been difficult to find every year ca. 100 
88 See Gabrielsen (1994: 194 and n. 47); pace MacDowell (1986: 443).
89 Gabrielsen (1994: 85–87, 177), Van Wees (2004: 308–310). See also MacDowell (1986: 443) and 
Canevaro (2016a, b: 58), corrected here.
90 Gabrielsen (1994: 74; 188–189).
91 Gabrielsen (1994: 196).
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new liturgists. Perhaps, normally, volunteers would have made up for the shortage 
of suitable candidates (exemption did not prevent one from volunteering). However, 
after the Social War, with the economic crisis, it is likely that volunteers became 
uncommon, and that even among the 1200 a growing number of people could argue 
that they no longer possessed the required three talents, and therefore escape liturgi-
cal service.
Leptines, by making the (ex-)trierarchs available for the liturgies, offered an 
effective solution to this problem, which forced the very rich to shoulder compara-
tively more of the liturgical burden, giving the less rich among the 1200 some res-
pite. In doing this, however, he also abolished honorary exemptions.
Demosthenes himself did not deny the problem; he just did not like the solution: 
at Dem. 20.23 he suggests that a better way to solve the problem of the shortage of 
liturgists may be to create also for the ordinary liturgies contributory groups (sym-
moriai) like those used for the trierarchies. Why does Demosthenes not like Lep-
tines’ solution? Because in order to solve short-term issues it may damage Athens’ 
recovery in the medium and long term. Demosthenes, like Xenophon, is well aware 
that honours, whether they bring economic benefit or not, are an important instru-
ment to foster trade, and that trade is ultimately the key resource an Athens with-
out empire possesses to secure wealth and abundant revenues. Repealing honours 
already awarded would damage the international trust in Athens, its ability to make 
credible commitments, and hamper the implementation of measures to increase the 
volume of trade in the Piraeus, from which ultimately depended Athens’ prosper-
ity.92 Demosthenes’ attack on the law was eventually successful, and Leptines’ law 
was repealed.93
5  Conclusions
Demosthenes’ speech Against Leptines allows us to see these wider issues as they 
were debated in the 350s, and as the measures that would secure Athens’ recovery 
were created and implemented. These debates can at first sight look messy, and the 
voices involved deceptive and self-interested. As these debates unfolded, however, 
within the institutions of the state—the Council, the Assembly, the nomothetai, the 
lawcourts—and the (economic and fiscal) issues of the day were analysed by them 
from a variety of perspectives, slowly, economic and fiscal policy was collectively 
formulated, designed, enacted and implemented. The complexity and sophistication 
of Athenian public finances and economic policy highlighted in recent scholarship 
emerged from expertise which formed, materialised, and was questioned, through 
heated and heavily participated public debate, within the institutions of the Athenian 
state.
92 For a detailed analysis of this argument, see Canevaro (2016a, b: 77–98).
93 See Canevaro (2016a, b: 98–100).
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